SUMMARY: By pointing out different forms of pre-reflective consciousness and comparing them to the con cepts of self in Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, it could be shown that both schools apply a kind of consciousness that corresponds to Frank's con cept of self-conscious ness and self-knowledge. As demonstrated, the first form of pre-reflective consciousness complies with the advaitic teaching of an unchangeable eternity of conscious ness, which is sub ject less and un der stood as being with out time and spa ce, even as being om ni pre sent. It ap pears im possible to re la te it to something else without it being objectified. The Vi śiṣṭādvaita Ve dānta school reinterprets the concept of pure consciousness and accepts it as ob jec ti fiable con scious ness, which is now considered "knowledge". At the same time it pre supposes a kind of in dividual consciousness which is called "I". Moreover, this school uses the argument that consciousness is unobjectifiable against the Advaitin to establish that objectifying does not im ply the cessation of consciousness, that is, in their case the consciousness of the in dividual self. Rāmānuja thus theorises, a thesis con tinued by Veṅkaṭanātha, that knowledges (saṃvit) can be remembered over time because, first, they are based on a con stant self, that is, a pre-reflective "I"-consciousness, and secondly, through this "knowledge", they can be known again by referring to itself in an other state (avasthā) than it earlier held. But what does this mean for the familiarity of (self-)con sciousness? Is it me diated? The self, the "I"-con scious ness, is al ways in a new, changed state of knowl edge. As far as self-luminosity is pos sible, even if the self can be ob jec tified, it is possible to say, without negating conscious ness, that it is immediately aware of being in a spe cial state if this can be proven through diff e rent means of knowledge.
Introductory remarks
To demonstrate the differences but also the accordance between concepts of (self-)consciousness in the traditions of Advaita and Viśiṣṭā dvaita Vedānta, which in the history of their polemic discussions stand in clear opposition to each other, I will base my remarks on concepts of pre-reflective con scious ness in the European tradition. For particular developments in the European philosophy of consciousness it has been de monstrated by Dieter Henrich 1 and later by his student Manfred Frank that consciousness can not be de fined ac cord ing to the reflection model due to cir cular argu ments; a subject's reflection on what is iden tical to the sub ject is im possible, because it can be aware of an identity with it self only if it already has knowl edge of itself. In such a case, while (self-)cons ciousness is not objectifiable, it must be pre sup posed. A decisive and influential passage to this effect, by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, through which the under standing of consciousness received a new impetus in the late eighteenth century and on which the philo sopher Dieter Henrich has relied in the last century, 2 reads as follows:
We become […] conscious of the consciousness of our con scious ness only by making the latter a second time into an object, thereby obtaining conscious ness of our consciousness, and so ad infinitum. In this way, however, our con scious ness is not explained, or there is consequently no consciousness at all, if one assumes it to be a state of mind or an object and thus always presupposes a subject, but never finds it.
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To diff eren tiate between refer ences to con sciousness and its de scription in terms of a sub ject-object re la tionship, 4 Manfred Frank has On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… in vestigated 5 the de velopment of theories of reflective and im mediate consciousness in Euro pean philosophy from Fichte onwards, de monstrating that (self-)cons cious ness is not a kind of reflective consciousness, but is pre-reflective, that is, it is prior to any relational concept.
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Such concepts of pre-reflective consciousness will be taken as a background for analysing how con scious ness is viewed in the In dian Vedānta tra dit i ons: the tra dition of the Advaita Ve dānta on the one hand, and the tradition of Vi śiṣ ṭādvaita Vedānta on the other. Both de ve loped a concept of consciousness that cor responds to the above pre-reflective con scious ness as traced by Frank in the European tra dition. The explanation of sub ject less consciousness (Ad vaita Vedānta) or the subject's state of being con scious (Vi śiṣ ṭād vaita Ve dānta) revolves around the two schools' different con cepts of self (āt man). The debate between the two tra ditions involves their claiming different forms of conscious ness (general or individual), and in how they avoid a regress ad in finitum.
to the La tin term cons cien tia. The La tin term is again a translation of the Late Greek συνείδη σις. In these lan gu ages it is cha rac te ri zed by the prefixes συν-or con-, with both words thus expressing the mean ing 'knowing to ge ther with'. The meaning of phra ses such as συν ειδέναι τινί τι or sci re aliquid cum ali quo is the know l edge of some thing that ap pears to gether with some body. Here, the word 'some bo dy' can mean, for ex ample, oneself, in the sen se that I am the one who is aware of some thing by virtue of con s cious ness. The re fore cons cientia means, above all, an accom pa ny ing aware ness that is al ways co-present and has a con co mi tant function for every kind of know l ed ge. For the meaning of conscientia, cf. Gloy 2004: 80-81. 5 Cf. Frank 1991, especially pp. 415-599. 6 For the purpose of this article, a selection of Frank's work seems recommendable. An overview of the historical development of concepts of consciousness is found in Frank 1991 and Frank 1994 . The latter volume is a collection of positions of self-consciousness of the analytical philosophy of language. Recent publications in German in which Frank develops his basic view of familiarity of self-consciousness are: Ansichten der Subjektität (2012) und Präreflexives Selbstbewusstsein (2015) .
What matches?
The Advaitic tra dition comes close to what Frank considers immediate self-consciousness, while the Viśiṣṭād vaitic tradition reinterprets the Advaitic con cept of consciousness, albeit still keeping the self (ātman) as pre-reflective.
The Viśiṣṭād vaitic tradition refers to what Frank calls selfknowledge, which takes its shape through the mere fact that a subject is able to recognize itself over different times and places, and even af ter unconscious states like dreaming, sleeping, etc. And yet, if a subject be comes aware of itself, it does not have aware ness of an I-ob ject. This case is compared to what was pointed out by Immanuel Kant: the idea that there is a crossover from the mere "I think" to an ob ject "I" is incorrect. In order to objectify the "I", the fact of "I think" must al ready be pre supposed; "I think" defines the transcendental subject only as a vehicle, but this subject can never become a content of our thoughts. Any attempt at making it an ob ject of knowledge would lead to a vicious circle.
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In contrast, what Frank calls immediate self-consciousness can be compared to the Ad vaitic concept of con scious ness. Al though it is not de nied that consciousness is con s cious ness of a sub ject, the sub jectivity denoted by the first person sin gular pro noun "I" plays a se con dary role.
Hence, according to this view, a per son can ne ver per cei ve something with out pre sup posing the pos si bi li ty of becom ing or be ing conscious, with out presupposing the fact of being conscious that something is being per cei ved. Frank il lustra tes this through the im possi bi lity of not being conscious that one is conscious. For him a statement like "I think that p, but that I think that is not known to me" is meaningless. He ar gues: Cf. Kant 1996: B 577 ff.: "We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in it self perfectly contentless representation 'I', which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a conscious ness which accompanies all conceptions." On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… I can have knowledge re gard ing something that I am not ex periencing. But there seems to be an an a lytic re la tion between ex periencing and conscious ness of ex periencing. This familiarity is im me diate. I mean by this that it does not come about by way of a de tour via a se cond con s cious ness, such as 'by means of' an act of judgment. (Frank 1995: 180-181) Frank provides examples of "familiarity" for different cases. For him there are two forms of sub jec ti vity, these corresponding to two ways of how familiarity can be made explicit. Both forms are im portant for our com parison with the traditions of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.
The essential self-familiarity of subjectivity can concern the mental event itself (anonymous, non-con ceptual) or the agent him or herself (the "I", conceptual). In the first case it has become com mon to speak of self-awareness or selfconsciousness; in the second, to speak of self-knowledge. In both varieties, […] both are not derivable from each other, and (third thesis) they present them selves as irreducible to natural events or objects, respectively. (Frank 2013: 171) In the first case, self-consciousness is prior to what we can refer to with any indexical word like the personal pronoun "I". Therefore it "is ab solutely not analysable in expressions that do not already pre sup pose it" (Frank 1995: 185) . Any reference "to a description to our sel ves is preceded by being familiar with the bearer of this proper ty in a way that cannot be ex plained from the de scription itself" (ibid.: 186). In the fol lowing dis cussion, these are the cases which will come up: that con scious ness is al ways pre sup posed, that it is not objectifiable, and that it is in accessible through deictic terminology. Fam iliarity en ables one to situate one self in space and time; it also enables every de scription of our selves (ibid.: 186ff). Thus, "pre-re flective" im plies for Frank that one al ways has con sciousness, not only if one is intentionally aware of it. It negates any distinction between sub ject and object and cannot be objectified by a se cond con scious ness. Whenever there is con scious ness, one can always be im mediately aware of it.
These points are also applicable for what Frank defines, in the quote above, as pre-re flective self-knowledge, which is essentially subjective and "just as im mediate as that of self-con scious ness". In addition, "im mediate" means here "that it could not be mediated through pre sen tations or ob jects, which would then turn out to be the knowing 'I'" (Frank 2013: 179) . Just as self-con scious ness is not analysable in ex pressions that do not al ready pre sup pose it, this is also the case for self-knowledge. Every time a subject tries to re fer to itself, it has circularly pre sup posed an under stand ing of the "I". But familiarity "de velops itself im me diate ly-with out any in tervention of an instruction coming from an object, a definite de scription or some de monstrative refer ence" (ibid.: 179-180).
Thus far it can be summarized that according to Frank, both concepts of consciousness, un der stood as self-cons ciousness or as selfknowl edge, try in their own way to avoid the flaw of falling into a dualism that implies a sub ject-ob ject difference. But how are these two con cepts ap plic able to the two traditions of Vedānta?
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The Vedānta School, following the teach ings of the philosopher Śaṅkara (8 th century), holds cons cious ness as being in and of it self, this de fined by terms such as "self-esta blished" (sva taḥ sid dha) or "self-il lu mi nat ing" (sva yaṃ pra kā śa). Such a de fi ni tion im plies that con s cious ness is im me diate ly aware of itself: one can not deny the fact of being conscious. And that one is aware or con s cious can be un derstood as pre ced ing any concept of in di vidual sub jectivity. Due to being already self-evi dent and self-illuminating, the āt man can ne ver be aware of the ātman; to be con scious the ātman ne ver has to ob jecti fy itself be cause it is al ready conscious ness. Thus, for the Ad vaitin, self-re flection of con scious ness is in ac ceptable, since it would be a contradiction to say that the ātman is cons ciousness of its own con scious ness.
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The other Vedānta tradition, the Viśiṣṭādvaita of the Rā mā nu ja School, re pre sents at first sight the exact opposite view. The ātman means 8 An attempt to link concepts of analytical philosophy with the advaitic concept of consciousness was un der taken in Strawson 2015. Here and there the position of Advaita Vedānta is referred to ap propriately; cf. 9; 11 fn. 22; 14; 18-19. 9 If this terminology is taken seriously, there are plenty of examples in which the concept of consciousness in Advaita Vedānta is understood as (self-)reflective awareness; cf. Ram-Prasad 2010: 234-236. an in di vi dual sub ject, that is, an agent re ferred to by the word "I" (aham), this de fined as a conscious "knower" (jñātṛ). To this is ad ded cons ciousness. Ne ver the less, the ātman here is not iden tical to some kind of em piri cal "I". Ac cording to Rāmānuja, the āt man de noted by the word "I" (aham) cannot be proven by any means other than it self. The term in this School not used before Yāmuna is ahamartha, the referent of the word "I". The self is even defined as self-illuminating (sva yaṃ pra kāśa); the self has the form of be ing conscious, but is at the same time qualified by consciousness. (Śrībh I 153,5 : ātmā cid rū pa eva caitanyaguṇaka).
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Thus, as I will try to demonstrate, for the Advaita tra di ti on, a compar ison looks pro mis ing with what Frank and his tradition define, in contrast to an egological-concept, as non-ego lo gi cal: a subject less con cept of con scious ness. In contrast, the con cept of ātman in the Vi śiṣ ṭād vai ta tra dition can be in ter pre ted as based on an ego lo gical con cept of cons cious ness, un der stood as the conscious sub ject, that is, the living self (jīvātman). The first per son sin gular "I" (aham) is only an in de xical word and is not to be iden tified with some thing per ceptible, although in every day language it is used by speakers to draw attenti on to themselves in con trast to others. The denotation of the ātman as "I" not only implies in divi duality, but also in ter-sub jectivity, 11 and thus it would not be possible without accepting a concept of em bodiment.
Manfred Frank
Non-egological concept of prereflective self-conscious ness Egological concept of prereflec tive self-knowl edge Advaita Vedānta Self (ātman) as self-illuminating (svayamprakāśa), self-evident (sva taḥ siddha)
Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta
Living self (jīvātman) as agent of know ing (jñātṛ), referent of the word "I" (aham artha)-having consciousness as the self's eternal specification (caitanya guṇa ka) Thus, I see it possible to make a com parison between Advaita and nonego lo gi cal theories of cons cious ness on the one hand, 12 but also with the egological pre-reflective form of cons cious ness on the other hand. As I will demonstrate, the latter is inseparably con nected to knowl edge of the out side world. This variant, from the perspective of the tradition of Vi śiṣ ṭādvaita Ve dānta, is more complex and takes into account that self-knowledge is related to being in a spe cial state (avasthā). Nevertheless, this does not imply that self-knowledge has the form of a subject-object relationship.
Examples of pre-reflective consciousness in the tradition of earlier Advaita Vedānta
The con cept of ātman, which can be seen in the Advaitic School of Vedānta as being equi va l ent to mere consciousness, does not im ply an objectifiable en ti ty. It is no t some thing ac ci den tal (āgan tuka) that can be proved and esta blished by a means of valid cognition (pra mā ṇa) such as per ception (prat yak ṣa) or in ference (anu mā na). Every piece of knowl edge about an ob ject, or, bet ter, any use of such a means of valid cog nition (pramāṇa) re qui res a self, that is, the ātman, identified as consciousness (caitanya). Thus, ac cord ing to the ad vai tic tra dition it is im pos si ble to re fer to the āt man as be ing an ob ject of knowl edge, be cause every ob jec ti fying act pre sup poses the āt man, that is, the in evit able exist ence of cons cious ness. Śaṅ kara thus diff er entiates the self, due to its being self-established (svayaṃprakāśatvād), as distinct from any ad ventitious en tity. 13 As he writes in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya: On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… In contrast, the self, due to its being the base for daily use as a means of valid cognition, etc., is es tablished only before (prāg eva) the use of a valid means of cognition, etc. And a refutation of such a [self-esta blished] entity is im pos sible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be refuted, but not that which is the es senti al nature [of the refuting person].
14 Fur ther, if one tries to describe the Ad vai tin's con cept of ātman based on the as pect of the non-re flectibility of cons cious ness, it is worth mention ing the cha rac ter of conscious ness de fined as being with out any re lation and therefore being in de pen dent (an apek ṣa). Another cha rac te ris tic feature is its de fi nition as self-establishing: it is without chan ge/mo di fication (nir vi kā ra) and is one (eka), and is the re fore in strict op po si ti on to what is referred to in this school as un cons cious/ insentient (jaḍa). What is self-established cannot be de tected as different from something el se-a point that be comes more and more important in this tradition in treatises refuting any knowl edge of difference (bheda) of the self. Śaṅ ka ra's direct pupil, Pad ma pāda (9 th century), em phasizes in his Pañ ca pā dikā the im possibility of a re lational self. A know able diff erence (bhe da) from con scious ness is impossible, because to recognize any diff er ence, con sciousness must be ac cepted as coun ter-positive (pratiyogin). Diff er ence is only bet ween con sciousness and non-con s cious ness, and the latter is, ac cording to his view, ex clusively insentient (ja ḍa):
And consciousness is not an object of consciousness, because there is no difference from the nature of con scious ness, just as for light another light is [not different]. of a difference from consciousness. He ela borates on the argument that knowing the difference from another consciousness is im possible by stating that the counterpart of consciousness would not be another consciousness, but ob jectified con scious ness, i.e. non-conscious ness (asaṃvit). To realize any difference of con scious ness, consciousness itself must be accepted as given. Pra kāśātman's ex planation is as follows:
Conscious ness is not different from another consciousness in the form of consciousness; con scious ness is one, because its counter-part would be non-consciousness. Even in the case of difference in the form of nonconsciousness, consciousness would only be one; therefore, for cons ciousnesses (saṃ vidāṃ), the re lation of object and subject [i.e. object-bearer] is impossible.
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With these words he not only refutes that there is any difference, because its counter-part is un conscious, but also points to the implication that consciousness remains one, exactly be cause its counter-part cannot be again consciousness. He concludes that more than one con scious ness, i.e. consciousnesses (saṃvidāṃ), is unacceptable, insofar as one conscious ness can not be an object of another consciousness. This view also rejects the under stand ing of (self-)consciousness as a reflective consciousness. Prakāśātman's re jection of any re lated type of conscious ness is taken up again in a later con text, with Śrī har ṣa (12 th century) dis cussing the same case albeit independently of Prakāśātman's thoughts on the matter. Thus it is clear that the advaitic view not only rejects any difference (bheda) of con sciousness, if the con cept of selfillumination is accepted; it also rejects any kind of reflective consciousness, as this would imply that a second different conscious ness would be able to objectify an other (previous) con scious ness. In this school, conscious ness is thus in fact understood as pre-reflective.
These short examples from the Advaita Vedānta tradition exemplify non-ego lo gical view points within the In dian con text of the Ve dānta On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… tradition, but they also reveal a de ci sive point through which one can refer back to the European con text. Al though the Euro pean discourse of sub ject less conscious ness versus a subject of conscious ness is con tro versial, it can none the less be pointed out that the dis crepancy in the pre mises bet ween the two views, namely, whether conscious ness can or can not recog nize itself, is pro ble ma tic. In order to avoid accepting that conscious ness re qui res a second conscious ness, it in turn requiring a next consciousness, this caus ing an in fi n i te re gress, an ab so lu te source, an irreducible con scious ness is ne ces sary, one that is therefore pre-reflective, a source that is self-given in the sense that its immediateness is unnoticeable before the cognition of something can take place.
This concept can be linked to Frank's key term "familiarity". While it is not absolutely equi valent, it can be shown that the Ad vaita tra di ti on responds to the pro blem that con scious ness it self cannot be known with out getting caught in vicious circ les by proposing the ba sic con cept of self-establi shed (sva taḥ siddha) cons cious ness.
An other analogy is relevant in this context: in the European tradition, the concept of sub ject less con scious ness challenges the objection that relating a past state with the present, that is, re cog ni tion, is proble ma tic if a con cept of sub ject/subjectivity does not exist. But is not a pre-reflective consciousness needed even in a case like this? This opposition can be con sidered a historical coun ter part to the Advaitic concept of self, the Vi śiṣ ṭād vaitic concept of individual self (ātman), which is spontaneously able to refer to its cons cious and un conscious states at any time. While this idea was developed from the times of early Vi śiṣṭādvaita Ve dānta, in this paper I will focus only on Rā mā nu ja 17 and, for the later period, on Veṅ ka ṭa nātha (1268-1369), who de ve loped the position of his autho rita tive pre de cessor. Befo re I refer to the con cept of in di vidual self in detail, I will follow up on the advaitic con cept of con scious ness by examining the ideas of the later Ve dāntin Śrīharṣa.
Later Advaita Vedānta on pre-reflective consciousness: Śrīharṣa
To introduce some of Śrīharṣa's key terms, I will re fer to certain sections in the first chap ter of his Khaṇ ḍa nakhaṇḍa khādya, namely, "The (self-) il lu mi nation of consciousness" (saṃvit pra kāśa) and "The re fu ta tion of the re la t i on bet ween object and object-bearer (i.e. cons cious ness)" (vi ṣa ya vi ṣa yi bhā va khaṇ ḍa na).
In the introductory passage of the third section of this first chapter (saṃvitprakāśa), Śrī har ṣa defends the self-evi dence (svataḥsiddhi) of cons cious ness against the Bud dhist doctrine of the void (śūn ya tā). The passage is re le vant to our con text, because Śrī harṣa points out that any kind of knowl edge which ar gues against the exist ence of consciousness, trying to pro ve its non-existen ce, must presuppose a conscious ness that every liv ing be ing (sar vajana) can im me diately be aware of. For the passage quoted below, it should be mentioned that a so te riological mean ing of the self-established cons cious ness can al so be im plied, this in cluding the fol lowing question: What evid ence can be found for someone who is de si r ous to know (ji jñā sa) not only an object, but the hi ghest Be ing, i.e. brahman, which is treated as equi va lent to conscious ness, i.e. the in ner self (āt man)? One might respond: if a per son can not ob jectify his/her own self as an em pi rical ob ject, the hi ghest aim, i.e. brah man, cannot be identified with a selfestablishing conscious ness, and hen ce no li be r a t ing in sight would be possible and the doctrine of the void (śūn ya tā) in deed suc cess ful. Against this notion, Śrī har ṣa ar gues that cons cious ness is a gi ven fact; it forms the basis of ev e ry act of cognition and precedes any cognition by which one could ne gate the ātman, that is, the condition of be ing already con scious.
18 Now, after hav ing claimed that such cons cious ness is self-estab lish ing, Śrīharṣa cor ro bo rates his own the sis by refuting On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… any possible cognition of the non-exist ence of conscious ness. Neither doubt (saṃśaya), nor false cog ni tion (vi paryaya) of the ab sence of con s cious ness, nor valid cog ni tion of its ab sence (vya tirekapramā) can re fute the fact that even a ne gative cognition already implies cons ciousness. This is why, in the case of know ing, it is im pos sible to ne gate or not to be aware of the fact that one knows. Hen ce, for Śrī har ṣa one cannot doubt that one knows, on the con di tion that what is desired to be known (ji jñā sita) has really been experienced. Even if one de nies the con dition of being aware, knowl edge must be sup posed that reveals the ab sen ce of the fact that the object one desires to know (jijñā sita ) is indeed known (pra mitatva). But knowledge of this type would have no re sult. Such cases are des cribed by Śrīharṣa in the fol low ing passage :
Indeed, when knowledge arises for someone who desires to know, the uncertainty "Do I know or not?" does not exist, nor the false cognition "I do not know", nor the valid cognition of non-exis t ence, "I do not know". Therefore, the total lack of incorrect cognition and of va lid cog niti on of non-ex istence of what is desired to be known (jijñāsita) leads by implication to the fact that [the object] which is desired to be known is [indeed] known. Be cause, otherwise [i.e., if there were no absolute lack of in cor rect cog nition or of a va lid cog niti on of non-ex istence] someone whose desire to know is not im pe ded would have a cog ni tion that reveals the absence of the object desired to be known, [and this would be a cog nition] which is implied by the absence of the being known (pramitatva) of the object that is desired to be known (jijñāsita). For a more comprehensive interpretation of this passage, including the histo rical background and Śrī har ṣa's discus sion with his op po nent, a Naiyāyika, see Granoff 1978: 110-112 . She makes the following comment on this passage: "When knowl edge arises, no one doubts, 'Have I knowl edge or not?' Nor does anyone ever assume that he does not know, validly or falsely.
[…] He knows correctly that he has knowl edge. Śrī Harṣa adds that this va lid perception can From the impossibility for someone to deny the fact of knowing, that is, of being aware, Śrī har ṣa derives the theorem that consciousness is aware in and of it self. He con cludes this passage with the sent ence: Therefore, the very na ture of this knowledge is exclusively established by all people's own self-con scious ness.
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For Śrīharṣa, the fact that the ātman is self-established is decisive and shows that there is no in di vi dual character of cons cious ness. The fact that every per son can as cer tain that he/she is conscious due to the self-evidence (svataḥsiddhi) of cons cious ness, and that they do not deny that he/she is conscious, points, on the con t ra ry, to the ge ner al cha racter of conscious ness and implies the de finition of omni pre sence (vibhu). This description gives him no reason to establish a com pletely in de pen dent "spiritual" being that exists only for it self, even though, ac cord ing to his school, the ātman is de fined as self-de pen dent (sva tan tra) or in de pen dent from everything else (an apek ṣa). This description is ra ther aimed at ev ery entity and cor roborates the self's general na ture. Thus Śrī harṣa can say that cons cious ness is the real na tu re/the self of eve ry thing else (sar vāt ma tva). And be cause of its all-com pre hen ding cha rac ter, it can be considered to be with out any know able differ en ce (bheda) from any thing else and held to be as having no difference, as being without a second (ad vai ta). Conse quently, the ātman is un li mi ted by time (kā lā na vaccheda), has no know able qua li ty (dhar ma), and is not re ducible to any par ticular pla ce (de śā na vac cheda). Hen ce it is said to be "all-per vas i ve" (vibhu). In Śrī har ṣa's words:
For this ve ry reason it is not an object of language use, caused by grasping a property [of the self]; and by its being unlimited by time it is said metapho ri cally to be per manent. Through its be ing un li mi ted by space, it is denoted as all-pervasive. And the usage of saying that it is the nature of all things and non-dual, etc. is based on the absence of any limit ation in terms of a mo di fication of existence.
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only come about if knowl edge is self-aware and requires no other knowledge for the de monstration of its own existence." Cf. Self-consciousness… Despite these descriptions of consciousness as a metaphysical principle, it is in fact open to question whether such a concept could be realized as con scious ness in relation to an ob ject. But is it not con tradictory to say that the ātman/conscious ness is the essence of all things (sar vātman), all-per va si ve (vibhu), etc., and at the same time to say that in its nature it is com pletely un re lated? What does it mean to suppo se a re la tion (saṃ ban dha) for cons cious ness? Would a re lation not again lead to subject-object divisions?
Śrī har ṣa deals with this problem in the fifth sec tion (vi ṣa ya vi ṣa yibhā va khaṇ ḍa na) of the first chapter of his Khaṇ ḍa na khaṇ ḍa khādya. If consciousness is self-evi dent for ev ery person, its rela ti on (saṃ bandha) to each indi vidual for whom it is evident-not reducible to a sing le re lation to one person-must some how be des cri bed. Nevertheless, he must sol ve the question of how an ob ject (vi ṣa ya) is com pa tible with the above-mentioned es sen tial as crip ti ons to conscious ness. How does Śrīharṣa evade the diffi cul ty of ex plaining a re lati on bet ween consciousness and an ob jec ti fied consciousness?
The following words of an opponent, who holds a different concept of rela ti on (saṃ ban dha), make clear that such a concept im plies du ali ty, that is, a diff er ence (bhe da) within self-evident cons ciousness. Nevertheless, this contradicts its non-dual (ad vai ta) and all-per vasive (vibhu) nature. For the op po nent, the meaning of vi ṣa yin, lit. "having an object", implies a re la ti on between conscious ness and objectified consciousness. If a relation exists, diff er ence (bheda) cannot be avoided. And if there is no difference, identity (abheda) would be esta blished and no relation ne cessary. According to the op po nent's view, in either case, whether it is iden ti ty (abhe da) or diff er ence (bheda), the argument to prove a relation bet ween ob ject and con scious ness fails. The opponent's argument is as follows:
Objection: And if [object and object-bearer, i.e. consciousness] are not different, the very re la tionship bet ween object and object-bearer is unsuitable, because 'bearing an object' means 'the fact of pos sessing a relation to an ob ject' and a relationship cannot exist with out difference. For [this reason], it is always ob served that know ledge of this re lati on ship is impossible if the re is no knowledge that the two ob jects so con nected are in their own nature diff er ent.
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Śrīharṣa's dis cus sion with the opponent is based on the dia lec ti c op position of differ ence (bhe da) and iden ti ty (abhe da). Where difference exists, there is duality, that is, a knowable dis tinc ti on ( bheda) between conscious ness and something else; if identity (abheda) is the case, one asks what consciousness is related to. The problem that arises here is its con nection with some thing different, while at the same time pre serv ing its self-established nature and pure character. Śrīharṣa must ans wer the question of how, or in what way, one can ar gue that a self-established con s cious ness is con nec ted to some thing else without re stric t ing or ob jec ti fy ing its own real nature (sva rū pa). In this context we can again re fer back to the original point: how or in which way is it possible to presuppose an ori ginal conscious ness prior to any difference in subject and object, but never theless for us to know that we are conscious of it without objectifying our consciousness?
Thus, the problem remains for Śrī har ṣa of how to describe their re la tion. Or should it be re jec ted? He tries to solve this by charac ter izing the re lation (saṃ ban dha) in the same way the na ture (svarūpa) of both re lation-bearers (saṃ ban dhin), cons cious ness and ob ject, is des cribed, replying to the op po nent's arguments as follows:
[Answer:] Not in this way, because the relation consisting in the con nection between object and subject is not diff e r ent from the ve ry nature of [both] relationbearers [i.e., object and subject]. And were it to be so, in the end their re lation must also be ad mitted to be of the nature of its locus, out of fear of an infinite re gress. And if it is as [you pre tend it to be], it must be ad mitted that, just as the cog ni tion of the re lation it self is possible without any diff erence between the two re lation-bearers [i.e. object and subject/object-bearer] and of On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… the relation it self, because the relation that is of the ve ry nature [of its locus, i.e., the re lati on-bearer's] ex ceeds the li mits of other re la tions-in the same man ner, a relation that consists in its es sence in the con nection between ob ject and subject/ ob ject-bea rer will take place even with out any difference bet ween the correlates [i.e. object and subject/ob ject-bearer], and in the same way, its know l edge will be pos sible with out knowl edge of their diff er ence. What is con tra dictory in this?
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From this passage it becomes clear that Śrī harṣa is re sponding with a differentiated form of identity (abheda) and arguing that a re la tion bet ween conscious ness and ob ject does not imply a knowable difference (bheda). By de fining the re lation in this way he avoids the division in subject-object.
But is the problem of relationship sol ved? Is it not equally contradictory to say that even a single relation con nects an object to the nature of conscious ness? The ques ti on about the relation between these two ex tremes again raises new pro blems and does not solve the op position between an object and the cons cious ness of it. What characteristics does this relation have? Is it eternal like con sciousness or is it non-eter nal and changing like an ob ject or a con tent? No satis factory solution can be found conceptually and per haps this is even in ten ded by Śrī har ṣa. 
ta thā sati ca sai va yathā saṃ ban dhamitiḥ saṃ-bandhasvarūpāt saṃ ban dhinor bhedam an ā dā yai va par yavas ya tīty abhyu pagan tavyam, sva bhā vasaṃbandhas yeta ra saṃ ban dha mar yā dā ti śā yi tvāt ta thā vināpi saṃ ban dhi bhe daṃ viṣa ya viṣayibhāvātmā 'yaṃ saṃ ban dhaḥ par ya vasās ya ti, tad ava gamo 'pi tathā va ga ma vya tirekeṇaiva bhaviṣyati, ko viro dhaḥ?
24 Phillips interprets this as an 'apparent paradox of re la tionality' and comments on the passage of Śrīharṣa quoted above: "In brief, no story can be told about the relation between awareness and its con tent, because that would invite the question of what ties the re lation to each, ad infinitum. What then about self-linkage (sambandha-svarūpāt sambandhinor)? This proves only the identity of cognition and its con tent-precisely the Advaita position" (Phillips 1997: 95-96) .
traditional concept of con s cious ness, one might say that he does claim to esta blish the pure fact of conscious ness; he ar gues for the fact that some thing can become aware. For this he must presuppose that conscious ness is already given. Nevertheless, Śrī har ṣa does not give a clear ans wer as to how one might de ter mine a relation. He even says nothing against a relation ship, but rather tries to avoid seeing the relation as a subject-object relation in which con scious ness must be proved by way of its being objectified. If we contextualize our result, a compa rison to Frank seems reasonable, namely, that consciousness is more fa miliar than any thing that can be cognized from out side, and that we in evit ably have con scious ness before we re fer to ob jects or are able to refer to any thing else. This is be cause the fact of being con scious is not ana lysable in terms that do not in turn pre sup pose con scious ness.
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Although Śrīharṣa's central concept of consciousness is outlined here quite briefly, it can be seen that such a concept is a decisive criterion for rejecting other schools' argu ments-this is what most of his Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya does. For Śrīharṣa, what is pre sup posed must be pre supposed by every re pre sentative of an In dian philosophical school. Whatever is claimed as existent or non-existent takes 25 How is Śrīharṣa able to solve the problem of different times with one un change able con cept of self-il lu minating conscious ness? Does he do this by avoiding the subject-object division, especially in reference to the pro blem of time and con scious ness, which seems to be a challenge? Indeed, another difficult question is in volved, namely, how Śrīharṣa addresses the question of different times and un chang ing conscious ness. His answer is central for his view: Both memory (smṛti) and experience (anu bha va) coincide in a kind of con scious ness that Śrīharṣa calls recollection (praty abhi jñā). He argues that both experience and conscious ness are nothing other than memory (smṛti), memory is no thing other than experience (anubhava), that both can coexist in re collection/re cog nition (pratyabhijñā), and ex perience can also mean me mory. The passage whe re Śrīharṣa is dealing with this question is the anubhūtitvajātikhaṇḍana (and following chapters) of the first pariccheda Khkh 133-179. For the important dis cussion of the concept of time (kāla) in Śrīharṣa, cf. Duquette 2016: 43-60. On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… conscious ness as an in eluctable fact prior to exist ence or non-existence of the world. As a consequence, no thing can be ac cepted as either existent (sat) or as non-existent (asat).
26 Śrī harṣa himself ex presses this, applying it in any debate with an opponent. If the opponent does not accept this pre sup po sition, he con tradicts his own ar guments, which thus fail. The opponent himself must pre suppose con sciousness, without which he could not argue for the existence (sat), the non-existence (asat), or the ir reality (mith yā) of the world.
Śrīharṣa hap pily (su kham) relies on the self-established brahman/ consciousness (KhKh 67,1 svataḥ sid dhe cid āt mani brah ma tat tve). He uses this to point out a self-con tra diction in the statements of his oppon ents, who decide, apparently arbitrarily (sva pari kalpita), how to differentiate between the means for establishing existence or non-existence and the means for criticising other arguments. Śrīharṣa's remark is impor tant; he is able to cri ticize his op ponents since they con tradict their own assess ments and thus stand in contradiction to their own pre mises of criticism: KhKh 67,3-4 "This con viction in your considerations is not right, because it is contradicted by the conviction it self (eva), which is accepted by you" (na sādhvīyaṃ bhavatāṃ vi cā ra vya vasthā, bha vat kal pi ta vyava stha yaiva vyā ha ta tvāt).
27 In Śrīharṣa's own view this means that if someone denies con scious ness as being given, before it is possible for them to deny this, they must have already presup posed con scious ness as self-given to argue against unobjectifiable consciousness.
As con vincing as this ar gument seems, its reverse can also be claimed. In the following discussion-especially Veṅ ka ṭa nātha's re jection of pure consciousness-exactly the same argument can be directed against the Ad vaitin, i.e. Śrīharṣa himself: If consciousness is defined as un objectifiable, one can not use con scious ness to prove that consciousness is un ob jectifiable. For Veṅ ka ṭa nātha, the consequence is that one makes use of different means of valid cognition, such as lan guage, inference, authoritative passages of the Upa niṣads, etc. And by using them to prove that consciousness is unobjectifiable, self-given, etc., one does not objectify conscious ness, but has to pre suppose another consciousness, and so forth. Thus, Veṅkaṭa nātha holds the view that the Advaitin con tradicts his own premises, because he necessarily objectifies consciousness to prove that it is pre-reflective consciousness.
This outline of the advaitic concept of consciousness against the background of the European con cept of pre-reflective consciousness may suffice for my purposes here. If one fol lows the historical dis cussion of Advaita Vedānta with the later tradition of Viśiṣṭādvaita Ve dānta, this de bate became end less. But in a cer tain way the argument of pre-reflective con sciousness is similar, and per haps in some parts even iden ti cal, to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic con cept of consciousness. It there fore seems legitimate to ask how the view of pure con sciousness is reinter preted from the perspective of the school of Vi śiṣṭādvaita Ve dānta. How is the con cept of pre-reflectivity still served?
Rāmānuja's concept of "I"-consciousness
In Rāmānuja's comprehensive reply to the various teach ings of the advaitic tradition-fol lowing in part his pre decessor Yāmuna, (10 th century)-he transforms two im por tant issues, ela borating on them thoroughly. First, he accepts the ir re ducibility of conscious ness, albeit not a ge neral consciousness, but an in dividual consciousness. Thus, secondly, replacing the ad vaitic con cept of a pure, all-per vasive and timeless conscious ness, Rā mā nu ja develops the view of an "I"-consciousness, which is inseparably connected to knowl edge.
What does a connection between "I"-consciousness and knowledge mean and what im pli cations does this have for the concept of prereflective consciousness? For Rāmānuja, this involves an im me diate aware ness of a special state. Insofar as one always has a special state On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… of knowledge, one is always immediately and therefore pre-reflectively aware that one is in a state of know ledge.
In Rāmānuja's terminology, the self (ātman), the agent of knowing (jñātṛ), is neither identi fied with what we call the em pi rical "I", nor is it identified with something com ple tely be yond sub jec ti vi ty. What in this con text is also defined as self, that is, the self of the liv ing being (jīvāt man), im plies an abi lity to be immediately aware of states in which some thing that has passed may have been un conscious. But how this is possible?
Pre-reflective individual consciousness for Rāmānuja can be described in the following way: When he defines the eternally selfluminous individual ātman with the word "I", this does not mean that everything which is said about the āt man is likewise applicable to "I". The word (i.e. pro noun) "I" (ahaṃ śabda/-pada) itself is not self-luminous. "I" is not some thing transient or some thing that arises and disappears with the statement "I recognize" (ahaṃ jā nāmi). For Rā mā nu ja, the individual ātman cannot be an object of a de signation for the pronoun "I". And the mean ing of "I" does not have a re pre sentational function. It does not re present the ātman itself, nor does it express an exclusive re ser vation for a single ātman. Moreover, not only one being says "I" to itself. There fore, who ever uses aham does not refer to a meaning of "I", especially not to "I" as an object. There fore, whenever we are at tentive of our self, we have, according to Rā mā nuja, knowl edge based on a pre-re flective "I"-consciousness. It is only knowl edge (and not "I"-cons ciousness) that can be objectified.
But isn't this a contradiction? Having one part of a cognition being by it self/for itself, the other part being objectified by something else? How did Rā mā nu ja arrive at this completely diff erent per spective on the relationship between knowl edge and "I"-consciousness? And how did he re act to the irreducibility of im mediate con scious ness as defended by Ad vaitins?
Rāmānuja's reinterpretation of the advaitic consciousness as qualifying knowledge
First, to reject the concept of general consciousness, Rāmānuja uses the me ta phor of light. For him, the meaning of "shin ing/il luminating" in this con text implies the shin ing of some one/some thing (kasya cid). This is in exact opposition to the ad vaitic identification of ātman and consciousness (saṃvit), as exemplified above. Rāmānuja de scribes the diff er ence between them as follows:
Precisely because it is illumination, the illumination should belong exclusively to a particular one (i.e. the self), like the light that belongs to a lamp. There fore the self cannot be [identical to] consciousness ( saṃ vit).
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While the advaitic position clearly advocates the identity between self (ātman) and con scious ness (saṃvit), here Rāmānuja makes a clear distinction between them. As mentioned above, Rā mā nu ja retains the irreducibility of cons cious ness by defining it as in di vi dual conscious ness. He does not do this by sub sti tu t ing the self-il lu minating "I" for the ad vai tic cons ciousness, but rather by retaining what the Advaitins understand as pre-re flective con scious ness. He gives it a different meaning, however. Instead of using the main advaitic terms re ferring to cons cious ness, anu bhū ti, dṛś or saṃ vit, Rā mā nu ja refers to a kind of know ledge that he no longer understands as pure and in de pen dent con scious ness, but as a "qua lity" (dhar ma) of the individual pre-re flective "I"-con scious ness. In contrast, the anu bhūti is now provided with an object (sakarmaka), which still has its own being (sadbhāva) and provides its own base (svāśraya) according to the daily use of language. Further more, the "I"-con scious ness, that is, the self as agent, functions in this object-gaining process only as a witness (ātmasākṣika).
What is called consciousness (anubhūti) is a special quality of the self, which is the agent of being aware; it is provided by an object, [it is] synonymous to 'knowl edge', 'aware ness', 'consciousness' etc. (jñā nāva gatisaṃvidādi-), [and it] effectuates by nature the suitability of a certain entity to every day usage merely through its own reality in regard to its own base [i.e. the self]. Just like having the self as [its] wit ness, it is well known to ev erybody [as in sentences such as:] On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… "I know the pot", "I conceive this ob ject", "I know this cloth". Even by you [i.e. the Advaitin], the self-il lu mi nation of consciousness is proved as being of such a nature.
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As this passage shows, while Rāmānuja does not discard the advaitic conception of con sciousness, he de fines it as a special quality (dharmaviśeṣaḥ) of the self. The re sult of this step is the following: The self, which in fact is individual con s ciousness, always has con scious ness as a qua li ty (dhar ma). However, in this context, terms like saṃvit, anubhūti, ava gati, by which the Advaitin refers to pure consciousness, are no lon ger trans latable as "con scious ness", but their meaning is now rather "knowledge" (jñā na). In deed, in several passages the word jñāna is used. But the fact that the term buddhi becomes especially in the works of Veṅkaṭanātha as fre quent as the term dharma bhūta jñā na, the cognition process is ap parently being given a dualistic form. This makes one consider the possibility of re modelling the cognition pro cess according to Sāṅkhya, in which the self, like puruṣa, is the con scious principle, with the other principle, the change implying prakṛti, ac tive for the pu ru ṣa. But Rāmānuja is not re presenting the Sāṅkhya view and his termino lo gy is again here the reverse. The Sāṅkhya terms for insentience, like caitanya, refer to the self, but the term jñā na refers, as for Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha, to cognitions like per ception. In con trast, Rāmānuja makes an effort to explain the two different principles as a unity. Insofar as the self as "I"-conscious ness is also defined as knowl edge (jñāna), the re sulting du p lex with the term jñā na, "knowl edge", is ir ritat ing, but in fact it does ap pear later, in works by Veṅ ka ṭa nā tha, to make the dis tinction between dhar mi bhū-ta jñā na, "know l edge that possesses a qua lity" and dhar ma bhūta jñā na "knowledge that is a quality". While these two forms of knowl edge are used as ho mo nyms when they occur side by side, they have in fact differ ent mean ings. Indeed, they are discussed in different places in Veṅ-kaṭa nā tha's work. But when they be long in se pa ra b ly to ge ther, they are essentially part of every cognitive process, as for example in the sen tence: "He knows" (jā nā ti), which is explained by Rāmānuja in words like:
Because neither in vedic nor in ordinary language usage is the pronunciation of a sentence like 'He knows' observed as having no object and no agent of know ing.
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The two constitutive factors that are essential for the act of knowledge expressed in the sen tence "He knows" are the agent, namely, the self-illuminated ātman denoted by the word "I", and his "knowl edge" (anubhūti, avagati, saṃvit) , that is, the former advaitic mere con scious ness. In the following, when referring to knowledge as a property of the self (dharmabhū ta jñāna, i.e. saṃ vit, anubhūti, avagati, buddhi, dhī), I enclose the word "knowledge" in quo ta tion marks. "Knowledge" can not be something that is produced. If the factor of "I"-con sciousness in the cognitive pro cess is pre-reflective and therefore given as by itself (sva taḥ), the other, i.e. "knowledge" (dharmbhūtajñāna), must be as well. Due to this, especially in the work of Veṅkaṭanātha, "knowledge" also retains its definition of being self-il lu minat ing. In an other passage, Rāmānuja explains the sentence "He knows" by stating that knowl edge, like hap pi ness, ap pears for someone. By this appearing for someone else, the sen tences "I am happy" and "I know" are equal not in content, but in function. He con cludes that "knowl edge" is not only given in and of itself, but shines for something else (Śrībh I 156,5-6 : "Being established only by its own being [and not by something else] in reference to its own self [as its base]"; svāt mā naṃ prati sva sat tayaiva siddhyan); in con trast, mere "I"-consciousness is sentient and al so establishes its own being in and of itself.
31 Ob ject-related On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… "knowl edge" ma nifests it self for this self-il luminated "I": something manifests itself for the pre-reflective "I"-conscious ness. This is why Rā mānuja refers to the self as "I" and not as pure consciousness (cf. Śrībh I 156,7 na jñap ti mātra m āt mā, api tu jñātaivāhamarthaḥ). Rā mā nu ja is clearly con ti nuing this dualistic interpretation of the cognitive process when he says that conscious ness pro vides knowledge for his own base and accomplishes the object for its base due to its own being:
What is defined as the fact of being conscious [means] illuminating in re ference to its own base, solely due to its own being in a present state, or [alternatively it means:] it is ac com plish ing its own object exclusively due to its own being. And these [both] , being established by their own knowl edge, do not vanish, although they are knowable by another knowledge; there fore the be ing of con sciousness/knowledge does not vanish.
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Thus, while self and "knowledge" are not identifiable with each other, they are in se parable from each other; they form a unity without which no cognitive process would be pos sible. If one accepts only one of them and says that "knowledge" arises and disappears, one aban dons the self as a pre-reflective "I"-conscious ness. On the other hand, assuming that only the mere "I" as the individual self exists, the problem then arises of how something im mutable can be re conciled with the "knowledge" of changing things that emerge and pass away.
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Against this background, according to Rāmānuja, the conscious agent, that is, the self, ex periences its relation to the world through different changing con ditions. The agent is able to know if he has slept tu sattayaivātmane prakāśamānatā. For a discussion of this passage cf. (Śrībh I 145,6-146,3) , Rā mā nuja ad dresses the inseparability of the self from suc cessive cog ni tions, but also its difference. well, is happy or feeling tor mented, is still going through diff e r ent stages of life or has been redeemed. In the passages cited above, one does find terms that re present the advaitic principle of know ing, terms such as anu bhū ti, saṃvit, etc. But they are used to denote a property (dharma) and refer to rising and vanishing "knowledges". The meaning of these terms as found in passages by Śaṅ kara's disciples or by Śrīharṣa has changed com ple tely. Pre supposed by a stable self that is a selfil lu minated knower, ex clu ding cog nitions can take place continuously.
Later Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: Veṅkaṭanātha's argument
How does Veṅ kaṭanātha respond to the resultant question of changing "knowledge" and pre-reflective conscious ness? Like Rāmānuja, Veṅ kaṭa-nātha defines the self, as for example in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana (=NSi), as an inward agent de no ted by the word "I". This is com pletely diff erent than the advaitic con cept of mere cons cious ness (NSi 187, 2) . If the self were anything else, an immediate cognition or re col lection such as "I, [enjoying hap pi ness now], I am the one [who was in pain the other day]" would be im possible. There fore, for this kind of "knowl edge", Veṅkaṭanātha presupposes that the self is pre-reflective "I"-consciousness (cf. NSi 195, (1) (2) .
Thus, what is per manent is the individual ātman, the knower (jñātṛ). It refers to its own ex pe rien ces at par ticular times through its own " knowledge" (dharmabhūtajñāna), which is defined by Veṅkaṭanātha as a separate substance (dravya). While still called a property (dhar ma), it is now again characterized by properties defined as states (avasthā). But even if the meaning of "I" is clearly an indispensable point of reference, the question re mains of how the self-il luminating self, denoted as "I", can remember itself, and, as a con sequence, imply in a pre sent state a relation to a past state of one's self? Veṅkaṭanātha explains different functions of self (ātman) and "knowledge" (dharma bhū ta jñā na), but mentions the dependency of cognitions 34 on "knowledge", even if both (self and "knowledge") On Pre-reflectivity of Self-consciousness… are de fined as knowledge (jñāna). In this con text he also mentions the pos sibility of re col lecting an earlier cognition, that is, a past state (avasthā). One can re mem ber that the person who slept was oneself, even though in deep sleep one had no waking con s ciousness. But one still has "I"-con scious ness. Recollection (prat ya bhi jñā) is the ac tual proof of the pre ser va tion of con tinuity. This would not be possible with out such an in di vi dual "I"-consciousness. One would not be able to remember past ex periences as be ing one's own. Thus the self, that is, the "I"-consciousness, as one and the same, has various cog nitions at diff erent times through "knowledge" and can be aware of what was cog nized earlier.
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But how does Veṅkaṭanātha describe this kind of "knowledge", to which he refers now with terms like dhar ma bhūta jñā na, saṃvit and buddhi? As Rāmānuja did, Veṅ ka ṭa nā tha teaches that if the self had no "knowl edge", it would be unable to cognise any thing. This is because pre sup posing only "I"-con scious ness does not take the place of a complete cog ni tive process. "Know l edge" is realized only as knowing one's own being in a special state, be it pre sent, past or future. Thus, while "knowledge" (saṃ vit/bud dhi) must be ob jectified, it is not there by negated. In this case, it is me mory (smṛ ti) by which one is aware of what hap pened at an ear lier time. "Know l edge" of what happened in the past be comes an ob ject of pre sent "know ledge". This view is once again a criticism of the Ad vaitin's thesis, which, as has been de mons trated, involves consciousness (anu bhūti) be coming non-cons cious ness (an anu bhūti) in case of being objectified. When one says "knowl edge exists", then "knowl edge" (bud dhi) ob jec tifies a different "know l edge" (bud dhi). But a different "knowledge" is the same "knowledge" but of another state (avasthā). In this way, "knowledge" knows itself in the light of "I"-consciousness.
In more detail than above, the following table summarizes and contrasts the main key terms used by the authors of the two Vedānta schools and places them in relation to the two above mentioned concepts of pre-reflective con s cious ness.
Schools, authors
Pre-reflective con- In the following, I illustrate Veṅkaṭanātha's arguments for the self--referentiality of "knowl edge" having different states by quoting from three works by Veṅ ka ṭanātha: the Tat tva muktākalāpa with its autocommentary Sarvārthasiddhi, the Śa ta dū ṣaṇī, and the Nyāya siddhāñ-jana. The claim of Śrīharṣa given above, namely, of an ar gument being contrary to the opponent's own premises, is now applied by Veṅ ka ṭa -nātha against the advaitic thesis that consciousness is unobjectifiable.
The decisive question of whe ther state ments about con sciousness, such as its being self-illuminated, etc., provide in for mation or not, de monstrates for Veṅkaṭanātha the necessity to accept other means of cog nition that pre sup pose objectifiable "knowl edge". The first example is the second verse of the fourth chapter on "knowl edge" (bud dhi sa ra) of the Tat tva muk tākalāpa; here Veṅkaṭanātha de mon strates that "knowl edge" is not some thing that one can be aware of im mediately, i.e. without using other means of valid cognitions. It must always be re cognized through other means of valid cog nition, such as the authoritative passages [of the Veda] (śabda), infer ence (anumāna), etc.
Due to memory and also due to [means like the] word [of the Veda], inference, etc., knowledge is known as self-il luminated. For the one who says that this unknowable knowledge is without spe ci fication, negation of his own speech would arise, because of being knowledge, etc. And the sentence/the sis: "In the case of being knowable, knowl edge would be insentient", is characterized by de feat. The argument of contradicting one's own statement not only concerns the fact that one is im mediately aware of con scious ness, but also refers to "knowledge", which never lacks a re la tion to some sort of objective content. With this, Veṅkaṭanātha corroborates the view that we can only know some thing by presupposing self-given "knowledge". According to him, such "knowl edge" does not cease to exist if one proves it with another state of "knowl edge". But this argument cannot be used if no thing exists for which the above mentioned means of valid cog nition is ap plic able. To substantiate the view that conscious ness is self-il luminating, one has to involve con ditions other than con sciousness. In his auto-com mentary (Sarvārtha sid dhi) on the above-quoted verse, Veṅkaṭanātha elaborates on this, arguing against self-il luminated con scious ness by re proaching the Advaitin that his state ment about the self-il lumination of consciousness is not viable. If the Advaitin ar gues that a sentence pre sup posing other means does not communicate any thing, his statement ends in a self-con tra diction since he must always ad mit that some thing is to be made known (bodhyatva). If he does not admit this, he can neither com mu ni cate that he knows another person's "know ledge", nor can he refer to authoritative sources like the śāstra, which is another means that pro pagates the desire to know brah man. The above quoted verse explains Veṅkaṭanātha in his auto-commentary as follows:
Is consciousness known by means of words like property-bearer, proban dum, lo gi cal reason, etc., [by sentences] like "Consciousness is self-illuminating due to its being con scious ness", or [ We find the same argument, in nearly the same words, repeated in the third chapter of the Nyāya sid dhāñjana. If one asks, "Does the sen tence that conscious ness is not knowable com municates either something or nothing," the answer is clear: it brings the knowledge of some thing and not of nothing. If one objects that brahman is completely unknowable, one con tradicts exactly the passages of the authoritative tradition upon which the doctrine relies. This would mean that a teacher is instructing something that has no purpose.
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If you say "Consciousness is not an object of knowledge because it is consciousness", then this is not the case. Does the sentence " Consciousness is not recognizable" convey knowledge or not? In the first case, awareness is cognisable exactly through this sentence; if it is undetectable, what is affi rmed [by such a sentence]? And if brahman is unrecognisable, it would contradict sentences [which are accepted by yourself], as for example [Brahmasūtra 1.1.1.]: "Then therefore the in quiry into brahman", "The knower of brahman reaches the Highest" [TaiU 2.1.1], "The self in deed is to be known" [BĀU 2.4.5] ; and what is the teacher instructing and for whom when referring to the as cer tainment and non-ascertainment of non-duality?
To sum up: Veṅkaṭanātha takes into account the deep insight of the advaitic position that the self is not ob jectifiable, consequently arguing that the approach to the "I"-consciousness is in di vidual and un ob jec ti fiable in the same way as the Advaitin's concept of consciousness; it is only possible through several means of know l edge, such as memory, reasoning etc., which is no thing other than a state of the "knowledge" (dharma bhūta jñā na). Self-consciousness… Moreover, the Advaitin him self must admit that he can not prove selfconscious ness in and of itself, but must pre suppose diff er ent means of knowl edge. Thus, "knowledge" (for merly for the Advaitin the pure consciousness) never ceases to be conscious, even if it be comes an ob ject. Indeed, if one says that consciousness is immediate and therefore without spe ci fi cation, then exactly this "being without specification" is according to Veṅkaṭa nātha al ready a specification of consciousness. Using memory, etc. to prove what is self-illuminating is thus inevitable. And it is exactly through these forms of "know ledge" that self-illumi nation or being self-evident, etc. is pre sup posed. But what implications does this view have regarding "know l edge"? If one objectifies "knowledge", one has again presupposed a state of "knowledge", and in doing this, a series of alternating states (avasthāsantāna) of "knowledge" (dharma bhū ta jñāna) is being described ad in fi nitum. Thus, there is no rea son not to ob jectify "knowl edge", which is manifest through its states again and again.
Why isn't such a regress ad infinitum a fault for Veṅkaṭanātha? The regress concerns only the series of states (avasthāsantāna) of knowledge presupposing each other, not the "knowl edge" as a substance (dravya) while the self (ātman), "I"-consciousness, is still the indispensible base for each cognition; if one is immediately aware of something, one has no ob ject-knowledge of "I"-consciousness. Thus, Veṅkaṭanātha provides the human being with an im plicit prereflective "I"-consciousness on the one side, and the reflective, selfreferential knowl edge on the other. Presupposing each other, they are different in function. "Knowl edge", which can be objectified, enables an explicit self-re fe rence. The ways to refer to oneself are innumerable, be cause my "knowledge" has been in the past, is present, and will be in future in the according state (ava sthā). The pre-reflective "I"-consciousness is the pre supposition for being aware that it is "me" who "knows" my own past, present or future states.
Ending here, the question remains how could one tie up with the European discussion of self-consciousness and self-knowledge, by which I tried to elucidate the concept of con scious ness of the Advaita Vedānta on the one hand and of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta on the other hand? To contextualize self-knowledge in the European debate not only Frank's re fe rence to the view of German idealism is helpful, but also his references 40 to positions of ana ly tic philosophy of language like argumentation by Sidney Shoemaker, who holds the view of subjective use of "I" which is resistant against any misidentification.
41 This con cept of con scious ness-consciousness that pre cedes any objectified ref erence to one self and therefore ex emplifies pre-reflective selfknowledge-can be demonstrated by the impossibility of say ing that one is in pain without being aware of the fact that "I" ex periencing pain. Or, in other words, pain without "I"-consciousness is not possible, and there fore no difference can be ob tained bet ween the exist ence of pain and the fact that "I" am conscious. It is absurd to un dertake a kind of self-identification to know that "I" have pain. Shoemaker differentiates this from an ob jec tive use in which we can misidentify which does not origi nally belong to us. His diff eren tiation 42 of "I"-use in subjective and ob jective helps us to understand the function of self and know ledge in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: Ap plying on Veṅ kaṭa nātha's thoughts this would mean: "I"-consciousness is the basis for conscious ness of objects and self-referential know ledge.
40 Cf. Frank 2007: 159-169. 41 Self-knowledge is not a kind of object-knowledge; a knowledge of mine could not be explained like I have "I"-consciousness, because this again presupposes "I"-consciousness. This is expressed in Shoemaker's words: "For awareness, that the presented object was ϕ, would not tell one, that one was oneself ϕ, un less one had identified the object as oneself; and one could not do this unless one already had some self-knowledge, namely the knowledge, that one is the unique possessor of whatever set of properties of the presented object one took to show it to be oneself" (Shoemaker 1984: 105) .
42 For Oetke's reference to Shoemaker cf. Oetke 1988: 536-549. 
